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From the Embodied Mind to the Social Brain: The Negotiation of the Self and Translation

Robert Bascom
United Bible Societies, California, USA

Abstract
In recent decades, scholars in the fields of anthropology, social psychology, cognitive linguistics, and neuroscience have contributed several key complementary insights related to the negotiation of meaning in communication. The first is that the way our bodies experience the world forms the way we think about everything. Another is that the negotiations of social identity and interpersonal relations are precursors to the rest of our negotiations of meaning. Finally, cultural reproduction accounts for a good deal of what we believe are our own ideas, thoughts, and experiences.

Keywords
frames, negotiation, cultural, individual, hierarchy, communitarian, Mary Douglas, George Lakoff, Erving Goffman, Jonathan Haidt, Alan Fiske, Antonio Damasio

Dedication

Roger Omanson has embodied the best of scholarship and an undying commitment to accessible translation of the Bible for most of his adult life. In his work as teacher and translation consultant, he has been a mentor to some, a friend to many, and an example to all. Roger was not (as far as I know) particularly interested in the area of cognition as a theoretical science, but as a practitioner of translation, none knew better than he the implications of differing cognitive environments. This small offering hopes to honor him for his many and varied contributions to the field of translation.

Corresponding author:
Robert Bascom, United Bible Societies, 2448 North Mar Vista Ave, Altadena CA 91001-2510, USA.
Email: rbascom@biblesocieties.org

Introduction

Over the last half century various scholars (Erving Goffman, Mary Douglas, George Lakoff, et al.) have made the case that a rich network of cognitive frames makes up what could be called the matrix of human experience for people everywhere. Furthermore, some of these scholars agree that frames (seen in this way) are not static entities, but rather are in constant flux, being evoked, discarded, transformed, broken, subverted, adapted, and resituated within the network in a never-ending dynamic process of negotiation on the part of participants through various kinds of social interactions. Erving Goffman and Mary Douglas make the case that the most fundamental and far-reaching of these negotiations has to do with the presentation of the self.

Douglas's grid-group heuristic taxonomy of these frames (which she at times refers to as "thought styles") is also supported by insights from scholars like Richard Shweder, Jonathan Haidt, and Alan Fiske, working in the areas of domains of moral judgment and the negotiation of human relations. These scholars will also be cited in an attempt to bridge the apparent gap between the personal and the social self. One of the basic links in the chain is the idea that cognition begins in the emotional (psychologists call it the affective) sphere and is not limited to what is normally thought of as reason and reflection. In this way too George Lakoff's idea of conceptual metaphors and the embodied mind can be expanded to include the social brain. In particular it is by means of a "Theory of Mind" (ToM; what neuroscientists sometimes call simulation, achieved in part through mirror neurons) that what is usually thought of as purely personal can also be seen as social and what is usually thought of as cognitive in a purely reflective sense can be seen as including an emotional dimension as well.

Frames and Framing

Cognitive and cultural frames are most often presented as static entities, basic building blocks waiting to be used by individuals in various situations. Lakoff (1999, 116) uses the example of a restaurant, where elements such as waiters, menus, and checks are expected and even necessary elements defining the overall situation of "restaurant."[1]

[1] We will present overlapping sets of taxonomies (and in particular one) of the construction of the self (or selves). Key to this self-construction will be the inclusion of the affective aspects of the person in cognition, and in particular, the understanding of the "social brain" as fundamental to the process.

This way of thinking about frames is indeed very useful, and can explain such things as how one can more or less understand what is being communicated in contexts such as a fast-food drive-thru restaurant or a busy airport when the broken speaker to which one is directing one's attention produces only unintelligible squawks.

Frames, even in the above cases, are being constantly negotiated, constructed, manipulated, and destroyed at many levels, and interactants make use of any and all linguistic tools available to them to evoke whatever frames suit their purposes. Thus a rhetorical question provides the hearer with the expected answer embedded in the supposed question (e.g., "do you think I'm stupid?"), creating a frame of a question with a built-in answer, semantically equivalent at some level to a strong statement ("I'm *not* stupid"). Metaphors evoking images (e.g., Lakoff's example of "don't think of an elephant") can be built upon for the purpose of comparison (clumsiness, unavoidability, etc.). These frames are all present potentially but only come into being in the various acts of framing in communication and interaction within given local contexts. These frames are used to evoke various cognitive processes, and can thus be usefully seen as dynamic and ephemeral. In Table 1 we see just two examples in very different domains of various types of frames used to evoke various cognitive and affective responses.

According to Goffman and Douglas, the way most frames come into being, get modified, and pass out of existence is through social interaction. As a sociologist, Goffman believed cognitive frames are always reducible to social or natural ones, since they are evoked within the context of social negotiation or interaction with the natural world. He went on to describe these negotiations with various metaphors, from frames and framing (*Frame Analysis*), to theater, with roles and various elements of the staging process (*The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*), to the concept of the "total

Table 1. Frames.

Lexicon/values:	*Lexical term/phrase*	*Frames (evoking values)*
	Illegal Immigrants/aliens	Crime and foreigners/ non-humans
	Undocumented workers	Bureaucracy and labor
	Economic refugees	Class distinction and human rights
Phonology/semantics:	*Phonological unit*	*Frame (evoking semantics)*
	Gl- (glint, glisten, glow, glory, etc.)	Something about light

institution" in mental health treatment (*Asylums*), to "spoiled identity" (*Stigma*), public behavior (*Behavior in Public Places*), or the idea of the sacred self (*Interaction Ritual*). Goffman was more interested in the actual "grammar" of behavior than in taxonomies, and worked with various local concepts based on the metaphors he utilized (e.g., front and back space from theater, deference and demeanor from ritual, the maintenance of appropriate identity from mental health).

Two of Goffman's clearest and strongest statements in relation to the negotiated (social) self[2] as the basis for human interaction and communication come in lesser-known works. The first is from *Asylums*, where he puts forth the idea that the self is not so much *revealed* in all the diverse interactions it has with others as it is *constituted* by these interactions. Furthermore, to the extent that these interactions are represented by symbolic means (including communication), Goffman believed that the symbols themselves can be understood as constitutive of personal and group identity. He went further in *Interaction Ritual* (1967, 84–85):

> The individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only certain parts. Each individual is responsible for the demeanor image of himself and the deference image of others. … While it may be true that the individual has a unique self all his own, evidence of this possession is thoroughly a product of joint ceremonial labor.

Theory of Mind and Cultural Embodiment

The mechanism for the evocation (including creation, transformation, subversion, and destruction) of frames has been postulated recently as "simulation." Jerome Feldman describes this in terms of the acquisition of language among children: "[Certain] words explicitly involve acts of communication with another person. … This seems to require that the child have causal simulation models that involve other people." Furthermore, according to Feldman, "language primarily operates at the level of frame parameters and understanding involves imaginative simulation invoked by these frames" (2006, 132, 147).

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[2] Antonio Damasio (a neuroscientist cited by Jonathan Haidt and others below) takes a more individualist approach to the definition of the self, yet it is one which is entirely compatible with the social self in which Goffman is interested. Damasio and others like him point out that "the body is a foundation of the conscious mind" (2010, 20). This formulation in turn sounds remarkably like George Lakoff's concept of the embodied mind (1999, *passim*), of which the social brain is but a logical extension (by means of theory of mind—see below).

Michael Tomasello uses the more common terminology of *theory of mind* to describe a more specific version of this same mechanism: "cultural learning … [is] made possible by a very special form of social cognition, namely, the ability of individual organisms to understand conspecifics as beings *like themselves* who have intentional and mental lives like their own" (2000, 5, 178ff., 205).

While more empirical research is needed in support of these theories as to the connection of theory of mind and the development of language, it is a promising area of study. If correct, it would provide a crucial link in the extension of Lakoff's embodied mind to explicitly incorporate Goffman's ideas of the negotiation of the self via what could be called the social brain.

Theory of mind builds on the idea of the embodied nature of cultural learning. Haidt, for example, includes cultural immersion as well as peer socialization as elements in the development of moral judgment. He concludes one section with what serves as an interesting bridge between Lakoff's embodied mind and Douglas's thought styles: "Even though people in all cultures have more or less the same bodies, they have different embodiments, and therefore they end up with different minds." Haidt's summary of the developmental literature on moral judgment is worth quoting in its entirety:

> People can acquire explicit propositional knowledge about right and wrong in adulthood, but it is primarily through participation in custom complexes (Shweder, et al., 1998) involving sensory, motor, and other forms of implicit knowledge (Fiske, 1999; Lieberman, 2000; Shore, 1996), that are shared with one's peers during the sensitive period of late childhood and adolescence (Harris, 1995; Huttenlocher, 1994; Minoura, 1992) that one comes to feel, physically and emotionally (Damasio, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), the self-evident truth of moral propositions. (2001, 21)

Haidt and Greene add to this picture from a neuroscientific perspective. They think they can see in brain scans that moral reasoning is fundamentally emotional and social as well as what has often been thought of as purely cognitive (i.e., reflective or "rational"):

> Neuroimaging studies of moral judgment in normal adults, as well as studies of individuals exhibiting aberrant moral behavior, all point to the conclusion, embraced by the social intuitionist model, that emotion is a significant driving force in moral judgment. … These results also suggest that much, although not necessarily all, moral judgment makes use of processes specifically dedicated to social cognition and, more specifically, the representation of others' mental states (ToM). … Morality is probably not a "natural kind" in the brain. Just as the

> ordinary concept of memory refers to a variety of disparate cognitive processes (working memory, episodic memory, motor memory, etc.), we believe that the ordinary concept of moral judgment refers to a variety of more fine-grained and disparate processes, both "affective" and "cognitive." (2002, 522–23)

Contrary to what we might think, we do *not* usually (1) reflect on our ideologies in order to (2) construct our values, which then (3) activate our emotions, which finally (4) guide our actions, but more often the reverse. Embodied activities (mostly learned as children) are associated with emotions which in turn coalesce into values. And finally a narrative is constructed to explain these behaviors, feelings, and values.

People who grow up touching their heads to other, higher-status people's feet (in hierarchical cultures) when greeting them learn *in their bodies* about both hierarchy and sacred space as it pertains to human bodies. They do not *feel right* about acting any other way, and come to reflect this attitude as well in their systems of honorifics, for example. These values may eventually find some narrative justification, but for most people their basic physical reactions are enough to keep them acting in accordance with established rituals (Haidt 2001, 20), which are simply explained as "this is how well-behaved people *should* act."

Children who are trained to sleep apart from their parents are likely being taught an embodied sense of independence while virtually no one would use this as a justification of the practice. Meanwhile other culturally patterned co-sleeping arrangements clearly foster relationships of familial dependency and unity, while once again any number of other justifications are likely to be invoked to explain the practice (Shweder 2003, 46ff.).

Thought-communities and Cultural Clusters

Douglas, as an anthropologist, emphasizes social frames and puts forth a short canonical-looking taxonomy known as "grid-group" (1966a, among others). She expands Ferdinand Tönnies concepts of *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* (but mostly referencing Emile Durkheim) into four categories or cultural types applied across a two-dimensional grid of freedom and solidarity. Thus personal freedom comes at the cost of solidarity and vice versa, or else the combination (of personal freedom and social solidarity) is unstable.

Douglas starts from the point of view that the conceptual worlds formed from the purposeful categorizing activities mentioned above are essentially social, not individual:

> Emile Durkheim had another way of thinking about the conflict between individual and society (Durkheim, 1903, 1912). … For him the initial error is to

> deny the social origins of individual thought. Classifications, logical operations, and guiding metaphors are given to the individual by society. Above all, the sense of a priori rightness of some ideas and the nonsensicality of others are handed out as part of the social environment. He thought the reaction of outrage when entrenched judgments are challenged is a gut response directly due to commitment to a social group. (1986, 10)

Douglas uses the work of Ludwick Fleck to further develop this idea of the social origins of conceptual systems, which he names "thought collectives" and "thought styles" (Douglas elsewhere calls them cultural biases, among other things):

> For Fleck, the thought style sets the precondition of any cognition, and it determines what can be counted as a reasonable question and a true and false answer. It provides the context and sets the limits for any judgment about objective reality. Its essential feature is to be hidden from the members of the thought collective. (Douglas 1986, 13)

Douglas has developed a grid-group theory of cultures which is an extension of the idea of personal freedom versus social solidarity put forth earlier by Durkheim and others as the contrast between community and society (*Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft*). The original social argument stated that where there existed a high degree of individual freedom, there usually was also a corresponding lack of social solidarity, and vice versa. Douglas has mapped this dichotomy onto a graph which describes not two, but four different thought-style patterns.

While Douglas herself at times seems to present her paradigm as if it is descriptive of essentially different ways in which cultures (but also different institutions or groups) think, it is probably better to think of Fleck's "thought styles" as frames or cognitive environments available (in theory at any rate) to just about everyone everywhere. Cultures and subcultures will have certain tendencies, as will texts and even textual corpora (see biblical examples below), but the key point is that these styles offer differing and to a great degree mutually exclusive ways of framing what are usually thought of as personal values in specific situations. And ultimately the availability of these cognitive styles to the individual is based on the underlying negotiation of the self in community and society (and in different situations) as independent agent, alienated individual, dutiful hierarchist, or committed communitarian.

In Figure 1, the horizontal axis expresses increasing solidarity while increasing limits on options are plotted along the vertical axis. The resulting chart describes four models, and Douglas argues that "cultures" tend



Figure 1. Douglas's clusters.

to cluster in these corners, such that one does not get the values and behaviors of the differing patterns mixing together to any great extent within a given local context. This does not mean that hybridization in terms of the use of the various thought styles in various contexts by the same people does not exist. That has always existed, and increases more each day. Yet it is virtually impossible to frame something in terms of autonomy (individualist frame) and duty (hierarchist frame) at the same time. These thought styles can express themselves in various aspects of life, whether economics, religion, politics, the arts, or even such things as "personal" taste. The four models are:

1. *Hierarchists*—socialist or welfare economies (as well as traditional communities), whose various and varied attempts to form a more structured society than that of the individualists give them a great deal of social cohesion but rob them of personal freedom. Knowing and keeping one's place in society is highly valued.
2. *Individualists*—market economies, individualist perspectives where the free and open exchange of goods, ideas, values, and so on, is the primary mode of interaction. Personal achievement is rewarded; failure to achieve on a personal level is not well tolerated. Competition is expected; conspicuous consumption is a sign of wealth and value.
3. *Enclavists*—also known as sectarians or communards, they value both personal freedom and social solidarity. The only way to achieve the latter without sacrificing the former is through sheer commitment to the group. This is often achieved by means of ideas about purity and boundedness which function to protect the group from

outside contamination as well as from members abandoning their commitments to the collective. Utopian groups cluster here. Leadership is weak, membership often temporary (e.g., political campaigns, protest movements).

4. *Isolates*—these people are not connected well to their peers, but feel trapped by rules imposed by the dominant cultural forms. They are the homeless, blue-collar workers on the bottom rung without union support, and others living at the margins of the other models. Perhaps iconoclastic artists and ideologues should be categorized here as well.

Douglas considers isolates and enclavists by their nature to be less stable, and thus less viable as long-term patterns than the individualist and hierarchist models. That is because she believes that what she traces out as the diagonal between individualists and hierarchists (shown in Figure 4 as the diagonal of power) describes the older, but still valid observation (by Durkheim) that individual freedom and social solidarity naturally work as opposing pairs to form the most stable cultures. While isolates and enclavists do exist, they usually do so in some sort of subordinate (marginalized) or dissenting relationship to an individualist or hierarchist society.

As Douglas's analysis applies to the concept of the self, it looks like the plotting of Figure 2.



Figure 2. Four selves in four perspectives.

This presentation is consistent with what Douglas has put forth elsewhere, and deserves a more extended treatment below. But Douglas, while talking in terms of "cultures" at times, seems (like Goffman) to use her thought-style types more as a matter of descriptive convenience than as somehow encompassing the entirety of all the complex systems of human interaction. Thus she states:

> If anyone protests that there are really fifteen, five hundred, or two thousand types, or six or eight dimensions, they mistake the exercise. Eleven thousand or a million would *not* be enough to cover the variety that is out there. (1998, 101)

Douglas insists that this four-fold structure is not "canonical" in that the model is an explicit "exercise," but also in that a kind of hybridization (or better, contextual compartmentalization) can be seen at work within the scheme, as individuals and groups negotiate meaning in three or four categories at the same time, or within different situations. A diagram of recent political divisions in the U.S.A. can illustrate this (see Figure 3).



Figure 3. Political divisions.

Here we can see that those on the political right can argue *against* government involvement in individuals' lives when the issue is gun ownership, yet argue *for* government involvement when it comes to helping out businesses with tax breaks and subsidies. Those on the left also argue for and against government involvement, depending on the issue (social welfare,

wiretapping). Note that the horseshoe brings those in favor of government involvement together at the top of the arc, while those opposed are more typically irreconcilably divided ideologically at the bottom. There also seem to be elements of Douglas's enclavist category (especially boundary-setting) at work in this aspect of the representation.

What Douglas states here is consistent as well with how Goffman views framing. It is seen as specific-purpose driven, arising from human interaction, and based on the negotiation of the self (as individualist, hierarchist, enclavist, isolate, etc.) as the primary layer of all human interaction and, therefore, communication.[3]

Douglas further maps out the cultural or thought-style types along the two diagonals of her graph. What she calls the positive diagonal (or diagonal of power) is where most organized groups and societies cluster. Hierarchy and individual competition are for Douglas the most stable of the groupings. Again, these two types correspond most closely to the original Durkheimian community/society contrast. Though they differ in how they are structured, they both have strong leadership which can reward members (by personal honor and financial gain or by prestige within the group structure) and punish them (by personal failure and poverty or by exclusion from the group) based on how well they are able to play by the rules of the ruling type (see Figure 4).



Figure 4. Diagonal of power.

While Durkheim and other sociologists were keenly aware of isolates (the term they used to refer to their alienated states was *anomie*), Douglas adds the dissenting enclavist (or communitarian) thought style and completes her paradigm with a negative diagonal (or diagonal of dissent)

[3] The resulting matrix of experience has been referred to as the maintenance of social occasions and the organization of experience by Goffman and as thought styles or cultural biases by Douglas. It also can be seen as directly related to (if not identical to) the concept of a shared cognitive environment in relevance theory.

between the isolate and communitarian poles. Here, whether in groups or as individuals, are the cognitive clusters which are anti-structure. Environmentalist groups, anti-war and other protest movements, and some sectarian communities represent the enclavist cluster. They have weak leadership and not much structure. They can neither structurally punish nor reward. Yet individual members have such a high degree of solidarity with other members of the group that enclavists can achieve a great deal together until such time as they decide not to work together any longer. Isolates, on the other hand, are completely independent, not even forming the temporary alliances of the enclavists. Either by choice or by lack of options, isolates represent the marginalized individuals from every other cognitive cluster (see Figure 5).

An important feature of Douglas's argument is that most of this loyalty to whatever thought-style type or cluster one belongs to goes on without the explicit recognition of it or of how it works by the members of the group. In this way it acts like the grammar of a language, known and obeyed by all who speak the language, but often explicitly known only to a few. In fact, the group loyalty is usually expressed not positively, but negatively. In her essay "On Not Being Seen Dead: Shopping as Protest," Douglas describes the choices made by consumers as "an agonistic struggle to define not what one is, but what one is not" (1996b, 104). Many have noted (see Hall 1966, for example) the hidden dimension of personal and cultural beliefs and values (though one might argue that marketing specialists and political campaigns must understand some aspects of these very well). Douglas's contribution is to attempt to categorize the kinds of systems to which these heretofore little understood or examined areas of social structure belong.

In more than one of her books (1992, 1996a) Douglas uses her model to look at different approaches to the problems of dealing with the natural



Figure 5. Diagonal of dissent.

environment. Here a different sort of illustration is useful. One can see the different cognitive styles at work in the attitudes towards nature and human interaction with it. Individualists tend to see nature as robust. Thus human intervention (logging, drilling, mining, etc.) is not to be feared, since nature will recover its equilibrium easily (in Figure 6, the ball representing the environment will roll back down into the bowl even when pushed far up one side or the other). Isolates take no particular view, and see nature as essentially unpredictable. Hierarchists are willing to interfere to a degree, but wish to put limits on human action with regard to nature. And certain enclavists will see nature as precariously balanced and in need of protection. These enclavists will oppose the intervention of the hierarchists and especially of the individualists. While all these positions seem to be about nature, according to Douglas they are really about the cognitive types. One can see how these views of nature justify the very kinds of behavior one expects from each of the clusters (see Figure 6).

In another application of Douglas's grid-group model (Douglas 1992), Gerald Mars has analyzed organizational cultures using various animal metaphors. The categories are self-explanatory, and the metaphors are helpful in capturing the distinctive traits of the four different styles or cultures (see Figure 7).

One can easily expand the model to include cultures relevant to whatever area is under discussion. Thus religion, or one particular form of it, can be classified as shown in Table 2.

In Table 3, the history of modern Europe and North America can be seen as a general move from hierarchist to individualist modes. Whether in the arts (the Renaissance), science (the Enlightenment), or religion (the Reformation), the trend has been from the upper right to the lower left. Recent trends away from all forms of organized religion in modern Europe and North America merely strengthen and extend the individualist thought style even more.



Figure 6. Ecology.



Figure 7. Organizations.

Table 2. Christianity.

Isolate— some forms of asceticism	Hierarchist— Roman Catholicism
Individualist— Protestantism	Enclavist— New Testament era Christianity

Table 3. Bible translation.

Isolate— marginalized persons	Hierarchist— ancient Israelite culture, most translating language cultures and some national cultures
Individualist— most consultants and some national cultures	Enclavist— NT and some translating language cultures

Domains of Moral Judgment and Forms of Human Relations

It is interesting to see how certain other students of human behavior have come to similar conclusions as those represented by Mary Douglas's grid-group taxonomy, often with no apparent awareness of or reference to her work

whatsoever. Richard Shweder has written on domains of moral judgment which he describes as the ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity:

> Presupposed by the "ethics of autonomy" is a conceptualization of the self as an individual … where the point of moral regulation is to increase choice and personal liberty. Presupposed by the "ethics of community" is a conceptualization of the self as an office-holder. … One's role or station in life is intrinsic to one's identity. … Presupposed by the "ethics of divinity" is a conceptualization of the self as a spiritual entity connected to some sacred or natural order of things. (1997, 138)

When reading Shweder's descriptions of these categories one can immediately see the connections to Douglas's individualist (autonomy), hierarchist (community), and enclavist (divinity) distinctions.

Shweder goes on to say something similar to Douglas's claim that her paradigm is meant to capture general tendencies which coexist and can and do compete for cognitive relevance within any number of given discursive contexts:

> The three thematic clusters … may be thought of as culturally coexisting discourses of morality … [which] are symbol systems for describing aspects of experience. More than one such symbol system may be applicable to any area of experience. … There is no reason that one must select one and only one discourse to represent an area of experience. (1997, 140)

Haidt sees moral reasoning from a "social intuitionist" point of view that "proposes that moral judgment should be studied as an interpersonal process. Moral reasoning is usually an *ex-post facto* process used to influence the intuitions (and hence judgments) of other people. In the social intuitionist model one [first] feels a quick flash of revulsion … and one knows intuitively that something is wrong" (2001, 2).

Both Haidt's location of moral judgments in the social arena and his view that these judgments tend to be produced at the affective level first and later rationalized support the kinds of "social framing" Goffman, Douglas, and Shweder all have put forth. This view of how moral judgments are formed in the real world fits especially well within Douglas's enclavist thought style as well as Shweder's ethics of divinity,[4] which primarily use concepts of purity and boundedness (rather than the rules of the hierarchist style) to achieve the desired behavior (by means of solidarity).

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[4] Haidt cites Lakoff on the idea that moral purity has been mapped onto the conceptual metaphor of food purity. He also cites Fiske (below) with regard to the four models of human cognition. Haidt claims that chimpanzees exhibit all of Fiske's socio-cognitive behaviors except market pricing—a seemingly uniquely human relational model (2001, 18). Haidt exploits his citations of various scholars from different fields of study, claiming this gives his theory greater plausibility due to "consilience" (see Wilson 1998, *passim*).

Fiske, unlike Shweder and Haidt, cites both Douglas and Goffman. He outlines what he sees as "the four elementary forms of human relations" (the subtitle of his book). These are communal sharing (CS), authority ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), and market pricing (MP). Again these can be mapped onto Douglas's diagram fairly easily. Communal sharing fits with Douglas's enclavist thought style, authority ranking with her hierarchist, and market pricing with the individualist. Equality matching does not easily fit in one category in Douglas's system (it fits in both the individualist and enclavist). But Fiske also has a "null set," which is a failure to negotiate any social relationship. This fits well with Douglas's isolate category (Fiske 1991, *passim*).

Haidt most explicitly lines up with the others when he lays out his "five psychological systems that provide the foundations for the world's many moralities." He explains as follows: "The five foundations are psychological preparations for caring about and reacting emotionally to harm, reciprocity (including justice, fairness, and rights), in-group, hierarchy, and purity" (Haidt and Graham 2007, 98). Haidt's categories are an obvious fit with Douglas's, Shweder's, and Fiske's typologies. These (three or four) categories from the various authors cited are summarized in Table 4.[5]

Furthermore, it is instructive to overlay the more recent categorizations of Shweder, Haidt, and Fiske on Douglas's grid-group matrix (Table 5).

There are of course obvious differences (mostly in terminology) which must be explained and brought together. Douglas's isolate category is really only matched by Fiske, who admits to a null set, or asocial category. Haidt explicitly relates his harm category to reciprocity and to Shweder's ethics of autonomy, and his in-group to hierarchy and Shweder's ethics of community. These in turn can be related to the others (Table 5). Fiske's equality matching may not match any other categories, or may belong best with his communal sharing when compared to the corresponding categories of the other authors. Shweder's ethics of community actually correlates with Douglas's hierarchist

Table 4. Categories and typologies.

Douglas	individualist	hierarchist	enclavist/ communitarian	isolate
Shweder	autonomy	community	divinity	
Haidt	harm/reciprocity	hierarchy/ in-group	purity	
Fiske	market pricing	authority ranking	communal sharing/ equality matching(?)	null set

[5] What Haidt in particular argues against (and Shweder as well) are earlier formulations (e.g., those of Lawrence Kohlberg) of moral reasoning and judgment coming from just one (autonomy/reciprocity) domain (Haidt and Graham 2007, 100).

Table 5a. Shweder—ethical categories.

	ethics of community
ethics of autonomy	ethics of divinity

5b. Haidt—domains of moral judgment.

	hierarchy / in-group
harm / reciprocity	purity

5c. Fiske—negotiating human relations.

null set	authority ranking
market pricing	communal sharing/equality matching(?)

rather than her communitarian category, and his divinity category as well as Haidt's purity category relate to Douglas's enclavist/communitarian thought style. But these are all quite minor issues, and a careful reading of the four authors shows they are in general agreement, in fact amazingly so given the apparent independent nature of much of their research.

A further fine-tuning of the relation of Douglas's and Fiske's typologies comes with a comparison of their prototypical descriptions of the enclavist/community-sharing categories. For Douglas this category's prototype would be a political campaign/protest movement or a utopian society. Solidarity is high, but so is personal freedom. This category is essentially unstable, and persons reasoning from it tend to do so when wanting to change something about the more stable individualist or hierarchist structures. Families in Douglas's framing thus might prototypically fit more in the hierarchist category, though she would no doubt admit families often show enclavist tendencies as well. Fiske, on the other hand, uses the family as his prototypical example of the community-sharing form of human relations. He would admit that there are authority-ranking elements to many family relations as well (parents/children, older/younger siblings, husbands/wives), but by his prototype he slightly rearranges the relationships of the overlapping categories he shares with Douglas.[6]

[6] Eve Sweetser (in personal communication) has reminded me that George Lakoff also referred to both family types described here. Lakoff labels them as "strict father" versus "nurturant parent" conceptual metaphors. Lakoff sees these conceptual metaphors as underlying conservative versus liberal politics in the U.S. (2004).

Fiske furthermore insists that his market-pricing relation really has no relation to ideas about individualism or competitiveness, but his market-pricing and Douglas's individualist categories do seem to overlap quite a lot in the kinds of examples given (1991, 18).

"Key Concepts" or "Key Terms"

An application of Douglas's model to key concepts in Scripture can also be enlightening. "Key concepts" (sometimes referred to as "key terms") have for some time been a special concern for many of those involved in Bible translation. There has been a feeling on the part of some that certain words or phrases, or better, the ideas behind them, are either especially important or especially difficult to translate, or both. But it has been difficult at times to explain why a particular term or concept should be included in the list.[7] Using Douglas's thought styles can help us to make a start, though it turns out that the list would have to be constructed anew for each translation project, at least in principle. Concepts are especially difficult to translate when the conceptual systems (cognitive frames) negotiated by individuals within the communities to which they belong are so fundamentally different that what might be the "corresponding" semantic domains cease to have the same content.

Faith

Faith in the Hebrew Bible (prototypically a hierarchist culture, though with many enclavist tendencies as well) is usually presented as faithfulness.[8] In a society valuing social solidarity, it is hardly surprising that this should be so. The New Testament situation is already quite different. The nascent Christian community is prototypically enclavist (though still within a hierarchist environment), and thus we see faith (or belief *in*) as trust and hope (cf. Paul's famous reinterpretation of the Habakkuk citation, "The just shall live by [their] faith[fulness]"). Yet in modern interpretation (stemming from individualist cultures for the most part), faith (or belief *that*) as mental assent or strength of conviction is often emphasized. For isolates it is difficult to predict, but one can imagine that faith for them would be both personal and risky.

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[7] Some have speculated that nominalization (the fact is that most of the key terms/concepts are abstract nouns in the original languages) is the cause of the difficulty, but to my knowledge no serious work has been done on the problem, even toward justifying the nature and extent of the list.

[8] This does not mean at all that faith as trust and hope is unknown in the Hebrew Bible. It does mean that the cognitive framing of "faith" in the Hebrew Bible is far more likely to be in terms of obedience and loyalty than in terms of the trust or belief (πίστις) of the New Testament.

Table 6. Faith/fulness (אֱמוּן/אֱמֶת, πίστις).

Isolate— "blind" faith?	Hierarchist— commitment/loyalty (faithfulness)
Individualist— belief/confidence/conviction	Enclavist— trust/hope

One can easily see how important it would be to know and account for the translating cognitive type as well, since one might need to mediate understandings of commitment and loyalty into a cognitive context of personal belief and conviction, or alternatively, ideas of trust and hope into a culture of social solidarity and hierarchy. Individualist cognitive perspectives often understand commitment negatively as odious duty, and hierarchist perspectives often see trust or hope as too weak to sustain the relationships between God and humans described in Scripture. Translators need to mediate these understandings one way or the other in order to ensure that the translating culture comes away with an understanding which evokes frames similar enough to those presumed to be evoked by the original communication to be considered a valid representation.

Thus "faith" in one Mayan language translation was often translated as "taking seriously what God has obligated himself to do (for you)." The combination of an aversion to abstract nouns in the translating language coupled with an attempt to capture the hierarchist and enclavist biblical overtones of faith has resulted in a rather long yet arguably functional (in semantic terms) translation. Meanwhile "faith" in English translations has often been inadequately understood as mental assent or strength of conviction, as noted above.

Righteousness

Righteousness is another term/concept with which translators wrestle. In Gen 38 the Hebrew Bible relates the story of Judah and Tamar, his daughter-in-law. At the end of the story (which includes Tamar tricking Judah into having sexual relations with her), as Tamar is being brought out to be stoned and in that moment reveals that Judah is the father of the child she is bearing, Judah declares, "she is more righteous than I am."

This sentence is utter nonsense to most modern readers coming from individualist perspectives. For them, righteousness is most often personal piety and virtue. Seducing your father-in-law by trickery not only does not qualify one as righteous, but quite the opposite. Yet for a culture of hierarchy, the whole point of the story is that Tamar was simply doing all she

could to fulfill the mutual obligations which existed in the relationship between herself and her father-in-law.

Table 7. Righteousness (צְדָקָה δικαιοσύνη).

Isolate— existential good faith (true to self)	Hierarchist— mutual obligations
individualist— personal virtue / rights	Enclavist— universal love

Judah owed Tamar a husband, and she owed him an offspring to continue his lineage. That she felt forced to do this by subterfuge and incest is secondary to the real point of righteousness in such a culture. The New Testament at many points assumes a hierarchist perspective similar to that of the Hebrew Bible with regard to righteousness, but at other times (as in Romans) seems to take an enclavist position whereby righteousness is more of a state of being in a right relationship based on trust (faith and universal love).

Salvation

Salvation is a term/concept which normally is discussed in commentaries under the headings of the individual or the community, and of physical or spiritual realization. As a matter of fact, the Hebrew Bible speaks often of salvation in both physical and communal terms (though the Psalms seem to have personal salvation in view in many contexts as well). The New Testament is frequently less clear on both levels, speaking of salvation through/in Christ without specifying directly whether it is personal or communal, physical or spiritual, or some combination of these possibilities. But the New Testament in general seems to favor a communal as well as a spiritual interpretation of salvation.

In modern contexts of interpretation, there is often a sharp difference between different interpretive communities regarding the biblical concept in general. Personal spiritual salvation is the preferred interpretation within the individualist cultures of European descent. Yet the theology of liberation has sprung up in the more traditional hierarchist and communitarian soil of Latin America, emphasizing both the communal and physical aspects of salvation, and not surprisingly, depending mostly on texts from the Hebrew Bible to support their case.[9] And when the audience is truly marginalized

[9] More recent charismatic movements in Latin America are tending to push back in an individualist direction.

(isolates), the salvation message is often of both a personal and an apocalyptic (future) nature. According to Douglas's analysis, we would expect just these patterns, as represented in Table 8.

Table 8. Salvation (יְשׁוּעָה σωτηρία).

Isolate— personal/apocalyptic	Hierarchist— communal/physical
Individualist— personal/spiritual	Enclavist— communal/spiritual

Thus a network of ideas of loyalty, obligation, and physical salvation of the community within the hierarchist cognitive cultural environment of mutual obligation represented at many points by the Hebrew Bible was first transformed in an enclavist perspective represented in the New Testament into concepts of trust, love, and spiritual community salvation. And these both have finally been largely distilled within modern (European and North American) individualist cognitive environments as conviction, virtue, and personal salvation.

Competing Frames for Sin in the New Testament

Finally, we turn to a more complex biblical example of framing. In the case of a text, the frame (or schema) is evoked by the text's representation, and the "negotiation" is a matter of how successfully the frame is evoked in the mind of the reader or hearer. There are at least four divergent representations of the concept of sin in the New Testament. Similar frame elements (individual, authority figure, etc.) are arrayed against various frame backgrounds (moral-legal/medical/animal care/journey). In each frame, the various items are mapped onto the background and thus change their shape.

One interesting aspect of these frames is that in the biblical moral-legal contexts, the object (the "sinner" or "defendant") refers to someone in the religious in-group (e.g., the Pharisees), while in current Christian interpretation, the moral frame is usually applied to the out-group. The same opposition holds for the medical frame, with outsiders being treated as sick in the New Testament while modern churches reserve the medical frame for "backsliders" within the believing community (see Table 9).

Table 9. Competing frames.

⇩ Elements | Backgrounds ⇨	Moral-legal (John 3.16)	Medical (Matt 9.12)	Animal husbandry (Matt 18.10–14)	Journey (Matt 7.13–14)
Individual	Defendant	Patient	Sheep	Traveler
Authority figure	Judge-God	Doctor-Jesus	Shepherd-Jesus	Guide-Jesus
Deliberative action	Judgment	Diagnosis	Caretaking	Guiding
Determination	Guilt	Sickness	Lost	Lost
Expected result	Punishment (Hell)	Death	Death	Death (destruction)
Action toward individual	Payment of debt-salvation	Treatment-salvation	Search and rescue	Show way
Return to balance	Legal-moral system satisfied	Restoration to wholeness/health	Return to fold	Find home (life)
Who is judged/treated in Bible	*In-group*	*Out-group*	*Out-group*	*Everyone*
Who is judged/treated now	*Out-group*	*In-group*	*In-group/Everyone*	*In-group/Everyone*

And it is even more complex. One can easily find references in modern U.S. evangelical preaching and doctrine to "the eternal punishment of the lost." This blends the moral-legal and animal care/journey frame backgrounds. In the Bible, the schema or scenario of the lost sinner (as a sheep) results in that sinner being found or (as a traveler) either finding the way or remaining lost. Meanwhile, the idea of punishment (and substitutionary atonement) properly belongs to the moral-legal schema.

But that this should be so is perhaps not surprising. Depending on how one has negotiated one's self within one's own cultural/social/personal setting, the different metaphors above will be more or less salient. The individualist will probably prefer the moral-legal schema, since it emphasizes personal agency and responsibility. The enclavist or communitarian might prefer the medical model, since it emphasizes care and solidarity. The hierarchist will likely prefer the lost sheep schema, since it emphasizes dependency and hierarchy. And the isolate will possibly be drawn to the metaphor of the lost traveler, since it seems to speak to the situation of the marginalized.

Conclusion

People in different cognitive environments discover through their own learned embodied actions what sorts of selves they are expected to present to the world. These identities tend to cluster into a fairly limited number of categories (particularly for specific communicative purposes): individualist, hierarchist, isolate, or enclavist (communitarian). Individuals negotiate their relationships with others and the world based on these ideas about their own selfhood, in part by means of theory of mind (i.e., figuring out what others might be thinking that is different from what they are thinking).

Much of the time these negotiations can be taken for granted (if enough cognitive background is shared). But negotiations often break down (especially cross-culturally) and people end up considering one another impolite at best and morally questionable at worst. Understanding the dynamics of identity negotiation should go a long way in helping translators and consultants (as well as other stakeholders such as Bible translation agencies and donors) mediate communication across the differing cognitive environments represented in the translation of Scripture.

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