

for the use of the tense is difficult to detect".¹⁵ The New English Bible takes the first clause as a general heading while the others spell out its contents. Yet how can "fearing God" be thought of as an instance of "honouring all men"?¹⁶ It seems to me that Dean Selwyn comes nearest to supplying the right solution. He maintains that here again, as in 1 Pet. 2:13, the aorist imperative "goes back to the moment of decision in the believer's mind, and might be rendered: 'Let your motto be: Honour all men, etc.'. In the first clause St. Peter lays down the obligation of the respect and courtesy due to human personality as such."¹⁷

Conclusion

It may be difficult, in some of the above cases, to translate the Greek imperatives. However, by careful attention to the aspect of the verb it should be possible to restructure the form of words in the receptor language to convey the precise meaning of the original imperative. Such semantic adjustments should make it possible to transfer apparently untranslatable distinctions in aspect between aorist and present imperatives from the source language to the receptor language.

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LINGUISTICS AND TRANSLATION IN SAINT AUGUSTINE

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It is a moot point just what St. Augustine means by the word *interpretari*, which can mean to *interpret*, *explain* or *translate*. His discussions on translation principles are to be found in his doctrinal works, especially the *De doctrina christiana* and the sermons on Scripture. Unlike St. Jerome, he does not see translation as his main concern: it is a device to help the exegete arrive at the precise meaning of the text in front of him. Furthermore, St. Augustine's discussions are based on the Latin texts with which his colleagues and congregations had to deal, and his references to translation are designed to show how and why an exegete should refer to original texts in explaining the Christian message.

Translation is a linguistic act, and, as such, shares in the characteristics of language. The goal of language as set forth in the *De magistro* is teaching and learning, which leads to wisdom and puts us immediately on the plane of the divine (*De magistro*, xi. 38). Especially in dealing with Scripture, St. Augustine never lost sight of his own preoccupation with man seeking and finding wisdom in God, a concept he sets forth in such lyrical terms in the *Confessions*. The attainment of wisdom, as this is a divine attribute surpassing the natural

¹⁵ C. F. D. Moule, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁶ Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 112, who suggests other reasons also for rejecting this solution.

¹⁷ E. G. Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

measure of things, is a function of divine illumination, which acts on our intelligence as it seeks truth. So that the model of cognitive linguistics, as we see it in St. Augustine, proceeds from the linguistic sign to reality, but under the guidance of the Holy Spirit (*De magistro*, xii. 40).

The theory of the sign is crucial to St. Augustine's concept of language: "When one speaks, one gives a sign of one's will by the articulations of the sound" (*De magistro*, i. 2). In accord with modern communication theory, St. Augustine divides signs into natural and conventional. The sign is not identical with the thing signified (*De magistro*, iii. 6). Words are conventional signs pertaining to the sense of hearing. In this St. Augustine is at one with de Saussure, who developed the theory of *l'arbitraire du signe*, and pointed out that in language the oral word has primacy over the written (*Cours de linguistique générale*, 97-103). The mode of action proper to the sign depends on the link made between the *significans* and the *significabile*, and this is to be made by both speaker and hearer if exchange of information is to take place (*De magistro*, iv.8). Again we have a parallel with de Saussure, in that St. Augustine's connection between the *significans* and the *significabile* is a more abstract model of the link between the *signifiant* and the *signifié*. Though verbal signs can be written, this is merely a mnemonic device (*De magistro*, iv.8), so that the nature of the sign is not changed by committing it to writing.

The sign itself is not a device for imparting information, but a mnemonic. Learning language consists in finding the connection between signs and the reality they signify. Signs can be taken in a literal sense (*sensu proprio*), or in a transferred (*sensu translato*); one can learn through linguistic signs only when their connection with reality is already known or easily demonstrated: knowledge is to be gained by experience of the things signified in circumstances which connect the sign with experience (*De magistro*, iii.6). Thus, though every language has its own way of relating its particular group of signs to reality (*De catechizandis rudibus*, ii.3) this does not mean that linguistic descriptions of the same event will be understood by those who do not speak the language in which they are described (*Confessions*, X, xx.29). However, though the primary connection of the sign is with its *significabile*, it can be explained by other signs (*De magistro*, iv.7). Hence the necessity and possibility of translation.

Partly because of its connection with exegesis, St. Augustine sees translation as a teaching device designed to transmit the meaning of the original, as language itself transmits thought and assists the speaker to lead the hearer to truth. Hence the list of duties of a translator that appears at the beginning of *De doctrina christiana*, III:

"The man who fears God will diligently seek his will in Holy Scripture. Humble and pious, he will avoid controversy; he will be forearmed with the knowledge of certain necessary matters, so that he will know the force and nature of things which are employed because of their likeness. Relying on the exactness of the text, which he will have skilfully assured by diligent emendation, he will come thus instructed to discuss and resolve the ambiguities of scripture."

De doctrina christiana, III, i.1

Again there is reasonable doubt whether St. Augustine is separating the function of the exegete from that of the translator. The first quality, fear of God, is a prerequisite for looking for truth. The "necessary matters" he refers to are knowledge of the original languages and of the customs of the people who wrote the original. In this he looks forward to Etienne Dolet, who produced a famous set of five rules for translation in 1540. Like St. Augustine, Dolet was concerned with the truth enshrined in the text. One of the ways of reaching this quality is by textual criticism. This is a theme picked up during the sixth century by Cassiodorus and the scholars of the Vivarium, discussed by Erasmus and the Biblical translators of the sixteenth century and gradually elaborated into a science during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Translation is the explication of one set of signs by another. The relationship between a sign in the original language and its *significabile* must be replaced by an equally meaningful relationship between this same *significabile* and a sign in the new language. This relationship can be of two kinds: proper and transferred, a distinction crucial to translation and exegesis. Dealing properly with this double relationship is the essence of the translator's task (*De doctrina christiana*, III, xxiv. 34). There are two ways in which a translator is to surmount this difficulty: knowledge of the source language, which includes knowledge of the source culture (*De doctrina christiana*, II, xiv.21); and divine illumination which allows him to see hidden senses through the transferred and allegorical meanings of the text:

"For the author in the same words which we wish to understand, perhaps sees the sense itself; and certainly the Holy Spirit, which works through him, has without doubt foreseen that it will come to the reader or listener. In fact, he has made provision for its coming, because it is supported by the truth."

De doctrina christiana, III, xxvii.38

Hence, despite his critical respect for the Hebrew original, he was concerned about St. Jerome's intention of translating from the Hebrew for fear that the insights of the Septuagint would be lost with resulting confusion in the Church (*Ep. LXXXI. 4*). Yet he does see a use for literal translations as far as the exegete is concerned: they aid in reconstructing the original text and show the steps by which the translator goes from the original to the finished product (*De doctrina christiana*, II, xiii.19). Divine illumination, which is part of cognition, allows the translator who is not working literally to see as part of the divine intention sense behind the original signs, even if they are unknown to the original author.

Thus the routine of translation is gaining a thorough understanding of the text in front of the translator. On the linguistic level, this means understanding not only the words, but also the relationships between them (*De doctrina christiana*, III, xxv.36). One of the factors in this task is understanding the culture of the people involved: one must not assume that social norms once valid are still so (*De doctrina christiana*, III, xviii.27); and one must under-

stand the social and intellectual meaning of the institutions and other social realities described in the text. Once this way to truth is taken, then the translator can be sure of divine guidance in the culmination of his work.

A translated text is a series of signs which refer to reality in two steps: the first reference is to the word in the original, the second to the referent of the original word. In many cases the task of transferring the full content of the sign is made almost impossible by the lack of complete correspondence between the words in question. Thus with a word like *ἀναβαθμῶν* which occurs in the title of Psalm 38 and in the titles of the Gradual Psalms, St. Augustine notes that these are steps that lead upwards, but remarks ruefully that Latin has to use a neutral word to translate the image (*In Ps.* 38:1). In his discussion of Psalm 6:2, he shows an appreciation of semantic coverage and partial synonymy: he recognizes the word *θυμός* (translated as *ira*) as referring to any emotion, and therefore covering the word *ὄργή*, which is translated as *furor* in the next verse of the text he is working with. He notes that the various Latin texts at his disposal transpose these words or use them indifferently. We must bear in mind that he saw such explanations, and indeed the whole of the *Enarrationes in psalmos*, as a pastoral responsibility before a population that had to deal with different translations current in the community.

Thus, if we are to regard translation as the substitution of one set of signs for another, we can expect a fair allowance for the lexical peculiarities of the Greek word. This was no new departure: both Christian and Classical Latin had been modified for the needs of philosophy and religion by the importation of Greek elements, and Latin words had been changed to suit the semantic characteristics of their Greek counterparts. Thus, we can expect a remark like the following:

“. . . *quia in iudiciis tuis speravi*, or as has been more diligently translated from the Greek: *supersperavi*. This word, although its composition is unusual, fulfils the necessary condition of an exact translation.”

In Ps. 118:43

As we have said, the Latin word was a sign for both the Greek word and the idea behind it. However, the solution was not always as radical as the coinage of a new word: in his comment on Psalm 77:31 he objects to certain translators reading *impedit* on the grounds that in the original Greek the verb is compounded with *συν-*, and not *ἐν-*. He even accepts the translating of an agglutinated preposition by a free form, preferring *permanebit cum sole* to *permanebit soli* as the Greek verb is *συνπαράμειναι* (*In Ps.* 71:5).

Everything in the linguistic sign contributed to meaning, so he is particular about flexions. Though he recognizes that flexions are not identical across language boundaries, a change in flexion is not to be taken lightly: thus a translation like *in profundis* will be preferred to *in profundum*, because the number is preserved and this use of the dative case corresponds to that of the Latin ablative. “Falsification” of flexions is one of the most common reproaches St. Augustine makes against colleagues who translated the Scriptures. Yet the goal of the process is not literal translation in the pejorative sense that this term has: in his praise of the *Itala*, St. Augustine remarks, “For it is

closer to the words and to the clarity of the sense" (*De doctrina christiana*, II, xv.22). The main assumption in St. Augustine is that if words are properly dealt with, the clarity of sense will follow. Elegance of expression was not one of his concerns. As in Tertullian, there is the fear that a too close regard for rhetoric will alienate the audience and come between man and his salvation: "It is better for you to understand our barbarisms, than to become eloquent through our eloquence" (*In Ps.* 36:26). One must not forget that Christianity had begun in Rome as a lower-class religion, and that much of the anti-intellectualism inherent in such a beginning could be found among the Fathers.

Before we speak of a theory of translation in St. Augustine we should be clear about what such a term entails. If we compare his writings on translation with those of later people, we find that he does not aim at a proper description of the literary aspects of the craft, neither does he go into the full ramifications of language resources and their use. Indeed translation is not treated as an independent activity, but as a component in exegesis.

The concern with exegesis, i.e. with translation in a teaching function, explains why the linguistic sign is at the base of St. Augustine's treatment of translation. Through the sign, language is a teaching device, and all manipulations of the sign are acts of teaching. This link between the sign and the work of translation could have acted as a basis for a theory of translation: both source and target text are seen as an assembly of linguistic signs, relating to the reality behind the text and to each other. However, owing to his interest in exegesis, translation is a side-issue, so that he does not develop his

Training Programmes for Translators

The following training programmes are planned by the UBS in 1973:

Africa

15-27 January: North Cameroun (for Roman Catholics)
Three workshops in Zaïre (dates to be arranged)

Asia-Pacific

March: Pyramid, W. Irian
15 April-15 May (or May): Baguio, Philippines
May: India
June: Truk, Pacific

The dates of training programmes for Pakistan, and for indigenous translators in New Guinea, are to be arranged.

Europe

September or October: Poland (for Poland and Czechoslovakia)
July: Yugoslavia

conclusions. In short, his approach to translation is that of an inspired amateur with a good knowledge of linguistics. Not that this makes his contribution to the body of doctrine on translation any less valuable.

His contribution is underlining the teaching validity of translation and its relevance to the Christian message. He is, in this regard, a useful foil to St. Jerome for whom the operational priorities were reversed. Though he was limited by his aim of explaining to his congregation the ways of translators, and showing his fellow exegetes how to cope with their vagaries, he marks an important step forward in understanding the nature of the translator's work.

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PUNCTUATION IN THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE BIBLE

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English punctuation practices in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remain a puzzle. We have, for example, a statement from the introduction to Hebel and Hudson's *Poetry of the English Renaissance* (New York, 1929), p. iv: "Frequently the original punctuation has left the meaning ambiguous; we have been forced to settle upon the interpretation which seemed to us closest to the author's meaning." This, of course, was written before William Empson published his study of ambiguity in Shakespeare's sonnets.¹

In the last decade other students have followed Empson's lead, especially in the study of Milton's poetry. Several of these students have pointed to passages in *Paradise Lost* where it appears certain that Milton deliberately cultivated ambiguity with punctuation.² Still, the work has not swept away the belief that punctuation in the Renaissance was either haphazard or designed solely to guide the public speaker.

One neglected source for good clues to Renaissance punctuation practices is the Authorized Version of the English Bible (1611).³ The lately discovered notes of John Bois, one of the translators who kept records during the final preparation of the 1611 Bible, make the point that the translators were not only aware of ambiguity but used it to good advantage in their work.⁴ Moreover, the translators from time to time seemingly achieved their ends

¹ William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1930).

² Good comments on Milton's punctuation are found in John Carey and Alastair Fowler, *The Poems of John Milton* (London: Longmans, 1968), pp. 427-428; Christopher Ricks, *Milton's Grand Style* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963); and Mindele Treip, *Milton's Punctuation* (London: Methuen, 1970).

³ It is worth noting that F. F. Bruce in *The English Bible* (London: Lutterworth, 1970) has said (p. 108) that Renaissance punctuation, at least in the A. V. Bible, was designed solely to guide the public speaker in church "to enunciate properly and to place emphasis in the right places".

⁴ John Bois's notes have been translated and edited by Ward Allen in *Translating for King James* (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1969). Allen's introduction discusses in detail the evidence for ambiguity in the A.V.